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Migration, Openness and the Global Preconditions of 
‘Smart Development’ 
 
In this article, we present a first empirical reflection on ‘smart development’, its measurement, 
possible ‘drivers’ and ‘bottlenecks’. We first provide cross-national data on how much 
ecological footprint is used in the nations of the world system to ‘deliver’ a given amount of 
democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and 
development, and social cohesion. To this end, we first developed UNDP-type performance 
indicators on these six main dimensions of development and on their combined performance. 
We then show the non-linear regression trade-offs between ecological footprints per capita 
on these six dimensions of development and their combined performance index. The 
residuals from these regressions are our new measures of smart development: a country 
experiences smart development, if it achieves a maximum of development with a minimum of 
ecological footprint. We then look at the cross-national drivers and bottlenecks of this ‘smart 
development’ and compare their predictive power using stepwise regression procedures. 
Apart from important variables and indicators, derived from sociological dependency and 
world systems theories, we also test the predictive power of several other predictors as well. 
Our estimates underline the enormous importance of the transfer of resources from the 
center to the periphery, brought about by migration, with huge statistical observed positive 
effects of received worker remittances on smart human development, Happy Life Years, 
smart gender justice, smart R&D, and both formulations of the smart development index. 
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In this article, we present a first empirical reflection on ‘smart development’, and its 
measurement and its possible ‘drivers’  and  ‘bottlenecks’. The very  idea of ‘smart 
development’ was first proposed by Meadows (1992) and has not been really followed 
up to now in social science ever since. In the face of the huge usage of this term in the 
international media, such a statement is perhaps surprising, but our verdict corresponds 
to the clear  bibliographical evidence on the base of such indices as ‘ISI Web of 
Knowledge’ or ‘Cambridge Scientific Abstracts’. 
The basic idea, proposed by Meadows two decades ago in his single pioneering article 
on the issue was that we should relate our whole concept of development, and not just 
economic growth, to the natural resources needed to sustain it. In a similar vein, the 
Happy Planet Organization presented the so-called ‘Happy Planet Index’ (HPI), which 
is, as it is perhaps known to the readership of this publication, an index of measuring 
the trade-off between ecological footprint data and life quality (Happy Life Years, 
HLYE). Arguably, ecological footprint today is the best single international yardstick 
for environmental destruction in a nation (see also York, Rosa, and Dietz, 2003).  
Economic theory, for sure, is conscious about the non-linearity of the trade-off between 
income and happiness, with rising income levels not necessarily increasing the 
happiness of all. This phenomenon has become widely known in the economic research 
literature as the ‘Easterlin paradoxon’ (Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
Oswald, 1997; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). But here, we provide the first cross-
national data, how much ecological footprint is used in the nations of the world system 
to ‘deliver’ a given amount of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
development, research and development, and social cohesion.  
To this end, we first  developed UNDP-type performance indicators from current 
standard international comparative, cross-national social science data on the six main 
dimensions of development (democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
development, research and development, and social cohesion) and on the combined 
performance on these  six dimensions (a  kind of super-UNDP  ‘human development 
index’).  We then show the non-linear standard OLS regression trade-offs  between 
ecological footprints  per capita and their  square on these six components  of 
development and the overall super-UNDP development performance index, derived 
from them. The residuals from these regressions are our new measures of smart 
development: a country experiences smart development, if it achieves a maximum of 
democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and 
development, and social cohesion, and the combination of them with a minimum of 
ecological footprint.  
We then look at the cross-national drivers and bottlenecks of this ‘smart development’, 
using standard comparative cross-national data, which operationalize standard 
economic, sociological and political science knowledge in international development 
accounting. We compare the predictive power of these standard predictors,  using 
standard OLS stepwise regression procedures, based on IBM SPSS XVIII. Apart from 
important variables and indicators, derived from sociological dependency and world 
systems theories, we also test the predictive power of other predictors as well, ranging 
from geography and achieved development levels to the clash of civilization models, 3 
 
feminist theories, migration theories, and the ‘small is beautiful paradigm’  in the 
tradition of Schumacher.  
In Section 2 we sketch a possible theoretical background. Section 3 will introduce the 
measurement concepts and the methodology of this essay. Section 4 will be dedicated 
to the presentation of the results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’, 
while Section 5 will discuss the results in the framework of earlier theories and hitherto 
existing research, relevant for our subject. Section  6 presents our preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background and earlier studies 
To present a theory or competing theories of ‘smart development’  is  virtually 
impossible, because there has been no measurement, let alone accounting of its cross-
national successes and failures in the literature up to now. We are really had to start 
research into this issue from ‘scratch’.  
In this presentation of possible theories  explaining ‘smart development’,  we now 
should deal with the notion of ‘openness’ or ‘world economic openness’. Among the 
studies, listed in international online-bibliographies as especially often being referred 
to, we find, among others, Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000; Dollar, 1992a and 
1992b; Edwards, 1993; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik, 2006; Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi, 2004; and World Bank, 2005. While Dollar’s writings, widely disseminated 
around the globe, were especially straightforward in suggesting that a high share of 
exports and imports per GDP, and hence, an outward orientation of the society in 
question, is especially beneficial for economic growth and works in favor of the poorest 
strata of the population, the equally widely disseminated and received study by Frankel 
and Romer, 1999, comes to a more cautious conclusion: examining the correlation 
between trade and income one really cannot identify the direction of causation between 
the two. According to that study, countries' geographic characteristics, however, have 
important effects on trade, and are plausibly uncorrelated with other determinants of 
income. Frankel and Romer then construct measures of the geographic component of 
countries' trade, and use those measures to obtain instrumental variables estimating the 
effect of trade on income. Frankel and Romer suggest that trade has a quantitatively 
large and robust, though only moderately statistically significant positive effect on 
income. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004 further shattered the optimistic 
assumptions about the beneficial effects of world economic openness on development 
outcomes in their study about the respective contributions of institutions, geography, 
and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed 
instrumental variables for institutions and trade. Their results indicate that ‘the quality 
of institutions "trumps" everything else’  (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004). 
Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures of geography have at best 
weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by 
influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, 
trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the 
"wrong" (i.e., negative) sign. In his influential study, 2006, Rodrik even went so far as 
to fundamentally question the ‘Washington Consensus’ based on open markets, which 
featured so prominently in Dollar, 1992a and 1992b: 4 
 
 
Table 1: Deconstructing the Washington Consensus of liberalization and openness 
  Original Washington Consensus    Augmented Washington Consensus 
1  Fiscal Discipline  11  Corporate governance 
2  Reorientation of public expenditures  12  Anti-corruption 
3  Tax reform  13  Flexible labor markets 
4  Financial liberalization  14  WTO agreements 
5  Unified and competitive exchange rates  15  Financial codes and standards 
6  Trade liberalization  16  "Prudent"  capital accounting 
7  Openness to Direct Foreign Investment  17  Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8  Privatization  18  Independent central banks/inflation 
targeting 
9  Deregulation  19  Social safety nets 
10  Secure Property Rights  20  Targeted poverty reduction 
Source: Rodrik, 2006, based on World Bank, 2005 
Appendix Tables 1a and 1b highlight the theoretical dimensions of this research paper. 
Among the many existing theories, we highlight here especially migration and its 
possible links to ‘smart development’.  
The divisive issue of migration equally divides opinions around the globe, and it also 
divides opinions among the global social science research community. Also, it must be 
mentioned in our theoretical survey. As it is well-known, migration is part and parcel of 
the ‘four freedoms’ of capitalism, besides the freedom of goods, services, and capital. It 
is only logical to treat its possible influence on ‘smart development’ immediately after 
dealing with the possible effects of ‘openness’. Migration might have a very big effect 
on ‘smart development’. Migration, after all, assures continued production and hence 
also pollution in the migration recipient countries, while worker remittances, sent from 
there to the migration sending countries, might contribute to overall consumption, well-
being and investment in environmentally more sustainable housing and heating systems 
in the migration sending nations. A flagship survey of the hitherto existing migration 
theories (Masey et al., 1993) came to the pessimistic conclusion that migration theories 
up to that time were either advanced to explain the initiation of international migration 
or put forth to account for the persistence of migration across space and time. Masey et 
al. suggested that, because they are specified at such different levels of analysis, the 
theories are not inherently logically inconsistent.  
As Taylor pointed out in his summarizing policy statement on the state of migration 
theory for the United Nations in 2006, indeed it would be foolish to exclude migration 
from any future discourse about global development: The number of international 
migrants has increased more or less linearly over the past 40 years, from an estimated 
76 million in 1965 to 188 million in 2005. The flow of international migrant 
remittances has increased more rapidly than the number of international migrants, from 
an estimated US$2 billion in 1970 to US$216 in 2004. Nearly 70% of all remittances 
go to LDCs. Remittances were equivalent to 78% of the total value of exports in El 
Salvador and 108% in Nicaragua. As Taylor also pointed out in a number of other 
studies, especially in 1999, worker remittances are especially affecting the  less 
developed sending countries by the multiplier effect, well-known in economics since 
the days of John Maynard Keynes (Taylor, 2006: 9). The optimistic view about worker 5 
 
remittances is also supported in the well-received comparative international study by 
Ziesemer, 2009: in this analysis, the author shows with pooled data for four different 
samples of countries receiving remittances in 2003 that the countries with per capita 
income below $1,200 benefit most from remittances in the long run because they have 
the largest impact of remittances on savings. Their changes in remittances account for 
about 2% of the steady-state level of GDP per capita when compared to the 
counterfactual of having no changes of remittances. Their ratio of the steady-state 
growth rates with and without changes of remittances is 1.39. As savings react much 
more strongly than investment, an important benefit of remittances is that less debt is 
incurred and less debt service is paid than without remittances. All these effects are 
much weaker for the richer countries. 
The  UNDP HDR 2009  edition  maintains that financial remittances are vital in 
improving the livelihoods of millions of people in developing countries. There is a 
positive contribution of international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, 
health and living conditions in places of origin. Even those whose movement was 
driven by conflict can be net remitters, as illustrated in history by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and Uganda, where remittances 
helped entire war-affected communities to survive. In some international migration 
corridors, money transfer costs have tended to fall over time, with obvious benefits for 
those sending and receiving remittances. Recent innovations have also seen significant 
falls in costs at the national level. With the reduction in money transfer costs, families 
who once relied on relatives and close family friends or who used informal avenues 
such as the local bus driver to remit are now opting to send money through banks, 
money transfer companies and even via cell-phones. An important function of 
remittances is to diversify sources of income and to cushion families against setbacks 
such as illness or larger shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or 
climatic vagaries (UNDP HDR, 2009: 72).  
Similarly, the UNDP also maintains that there should be significant aggregate gains 
from movement, both to movers and to destination countries. The destination countries 
will capture about one-fifth of the gains from a 5% increase in the number of migrants 
in developed countries, amounting to US$ 190 billion dollars. Immigration increases 
employment, with no evidence of crowding out of locals, and investment also responds 
vigorously to immigration. Population growth due to migration increases real GDP per 
capita in the short run, one-for-one (meaning that a 1% increase in population due to 
migration increases GDP by 1%).  
Migrants bring broader economic benefits, including higher rates of innovation. Data 
from the United States show that between 1950 and 2000, skilled migrants boosted 
innovation: a 1.3% increase in the share of migrant university graduates increased the 
number of patents issued per capita by a massive 15%, with marked contributions from 
science and engineering graduates and without any adverse effects on the innovative 
activity of local people. The United States, in particular, has been able to attract 
migrant talent through the quality of its universities and research fund and 
infrastructure and its favorable patenting rules. In Ireland and the United Kingdom the 
share of migrants with tertiary education exceeds 30%, while in Austria, Italy and 
Poland it is below 15%. Countries offering more flexible entry regimes and more 
promising long-term opportunities have done better in attracting skilled people, 
whereas restrictions on duration of stay, visa conditions and career development, as in 6 
 
Germany for example, limit uptake. The aggregate effect of immigration on the wages 
of local workers may be positive or negative but is fairly small in the short and long 
run. In Europe, both multi-  and single-country studies find little or no impact of 
migration on the average wages of local people (UNDP, HDR, 2009: 84-85). 
Summing up the debate, we should quote from the findings of Jeffrey Williamson, 
2002: mass migration made an important contribution to late nineteenth century 
convergence in the 'North.' In the absence of mass migration, real wage dispersion 
would have increased by 7%, rather than decreased by 28%, as it did in fact. GDP per 
capita dispersion would also have decreased by only 9%, rather than by 18% as it did in 
fact. Wage gaps between New World and Old would have risen to 128% in 1910 when 
in fact they declined from 108 to 85%. Real wage convergence before World War I was 
attributable to migration, about two-thirds of the GDP per worker convergence, and 
perhaps one half of the GDP per capita convergence. There was an additional and even 
more powerful effect of the mass migrations on global income distribution. The 60 
million European migrants before World War I came from countries whose average 
real wages and average GDP per worker were perhaps only half of those in the 
receiving countries. These migrant gains were an important part of the net equalizing 
effect on world incomes of the mass migrations. North-North mass migrations had a 
strong leveling influence in the world economy up to 1913. They made it possible for 
poor migrants to improve the living standards for themselves and their children. It also 
lowered the scarcity of resident New World labor which competed with the immigrants, 
while it raised the scarcity of the poor European labor that stayed home (whose 
incomes were augmented still further by emigrant remittances). South-South migrations 
were about the same size as the North-North flows. 
Sanderson, 2010, was one of the first consistent research attempts to bring in migration 
as a determining variable of social well-being. Contemporary levels of international 
migration in less-developed countries are raising new and important questions 
regarding the consequences of immigration for human welfare and well-being. 
However, there is little systematic cross-national evidence of how international 
migration affects human development levels in migrant-receiving countries in the less-
developed world. The Sanderson paper addresses this gap in the literature by assessing 
the impact of cumulative international migration flows on the human development 
index, the composite, well-known UNDP measure of aggregate well-being. A series of 
panel data models are estimated using a sample of less-developed countries for the 
period, 1970-2005. The results indicate that higher levels of international migration are 
associated with lower scores on the human development index, net of controls, but that 
the effect of international migration is relatively small. 
In terms of thoroughly tested scientific knowledge, based on large-scale, cross-national 
empirical evidence, the next  possible  alternative  theoretical tradition to fill the 
explanatory gap for ‘smart development’ accounting, coming to one’s mind, would be 
dependency  and world systems theory. Although its effect on the mainstream 
economic scholarly journals has been marginal, it had a very wide impact on the 
leading international sociological and political journals
1
                                                            
1 International quantitative bibliometrical data on the impact of scholarly journals, i.e. the frequency and 
structure of the references in the international literature, are now available from such indices as 
SCIMAGO (
.  Reasons of space do not 
http://www.scimagojr.com/, based on SCIVERSE-SCOPUS), ISI Web of Knowledge 7 
 
permit us to debate at greater length this very vast sociological, political science and 
economic theory literature, centered on the subject of MNC (multinational corporation) 
penetration and economic and social development. We should rather concentrate, first 
of all, on what was actually predicted in the Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson study, 
1978, which must be regarded as the most often quoted flagship study of empirical 
dependency theory, analyzing the effects of MNC penetration on economic growth and 
income inequality
2
Important later tests of these hypotheses, taking into account the most important control 
variables, like initial income levels
: 
‘(1) The effect of direct foreign investment and aid has been to increase economic 
inequality within countries. (2) Flows of direct foreign investment and aid have had a 
short-term effect of increasing the relative rate of economic growth of countries. (3) 
Stocks of direct foreign investment and aid have had the cumulative, long-term effect of 
decreasing the relative rate of economic growth of countries. (4) This relationship has 
been conditional on the level of development of countries. The stocks of foreign 
investment and aid have had negative effects in both richer and poorer developing 
countries, but the effect is much stronger within the richer than the poorer ones. (5) 
These relationships hold independently of geographical area.’ (Bornschier/Chase-
Dunn/Rubinson, 1978: 651) 
3
There was a real ‘growth industry’ of blossoming and booming dependency -  and 
world-system oriented studies of environmental problems during the last years. It has 
become really fashionable in many traditions of sociology and political science to 
blame the lack of ‘sustainable development’ on globalization and the workings of 
global capitalism, perceived as a center-periphery system. The central question, posed 
by Meadows, 1992, and by the Happy Planet Index methodology is not how much 
deforestation, ecological destruction etc. we face in the world system at given levels of 
, could nothing but support and refine the original 
argument, independently from the research design for different indicators, time periods,  
samples and methods (see inter alia and to mention but a few studies: Beer, 1999; 
Bornschier, 1982, 2002; Dutt, 1997; Heshmati, 2006b; Kentor, 1998; Klitgaard and 
Fedderke, 1995; Tausch, 2003; Tausch and Prager, 1993; Tsai 1995).  
Centre-periphery models in the tradition of Prebisch, 1950, 1983, 1988, and the proper 
‘dependency theories’ in the tradition of such authors as Cardoso, 1977, 1979, 
Cardoso/Faletto, 1971, Furtado, 1963, 1964, 1976, 1983, Sunkel, 1966, 1973, 1978, 
and the quantitative research inspired by these theories, namely by Galtung, 1971, 
Sunkel, 1973 and later Chase-Dunn, 1975, Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978 
and Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, 1979 all can be important elements in the debate about 
‘smart development’. All these theories claimed that the relations of dependency block 
long-run economic growth and bring about a socially unbalanced development, short 
spurts of economic growth notwithstanding.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Reuters/Thomson  http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/) and SCIVERSE-SCOPUS (Elsevier 
http://www.hub.sciverse.com/action/home/proceed), which are available on-line at major Universities 
and research centers around the globe.  
2  International quotation figures, based on ISI Web of Knowledge (Reuters/Thomson 
http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/).  
3 Also conventional economic theory of growth accounting and income inequality accounting practices 
such controls. To treat properly what economists tend to call the convergence effects of poor countries 
growing faster than richer ones, see, among others, Barro, 2003.  8 
 
development, but how much footprint was consumed in the nations of the world system 
to ‘deliver’ a given amount of development [democracy, economic growth, gender 
equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion].  
Nevertheless, the relatively coherent tendency of these studies, most notably Dick and 
Jorgenson, 2010; Jorgenson and Burns, 2007; Jorgenson, 2003; 2004a, 2004b; 2005; 
2006a, 2006b; 2007a, 2007b; 2008; 2009a, 2009b; Jorgenson, and Burns, 2004; 
Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga, 2007; Jorgenson, Kuykendall, and Kennon 2008; 
Lawrence, 2009; Longo and York, 2008; Mostafa and Nataraajan, 2009; Mostafa, 
2010a, 2010b; Nugent, and Shandra, 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b; Shandra, and 
London, 2008; Shandra, Leckband, and London, 2009; Shandra, Leckband, McKinney, 
and London 2009; Shandra, London, Whooley, and Williamson, 2004; and finally 
Shandra, Shor, and London, 2008, 2009 suggests that there seems to be a strong causal 
interaction between transnational capitalist penetration and environmental degradation, 
especially in third world countries. To date, the most important counter-study to this 
fledging scientific tradition was the essay by Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, and 
Jenkins, 2002, which analyzed deforestation rates 1980-1995 in the developing 
countries, using ordinary least squares regression. Net of controls for initial forest stock 
and the quality of deforestation estimates, the authors find strong evidence for an 
‘environmental Kuznets’ curve
4
It is now time to present also some thoughts on the other control variables (see also 
Appendix Table 1a and 1b). A number of high-profile studies in economics have used 
such control variables, while the sociological profession seems to be more cautious 
about  their use
 driven by (1) agglomeration effects linked to the 
level of urbanization, (2) rural-to-urban migration that partially offsets rural population 
pressure, (3) the growth of services-dominated urban economies, and (4) strong 
democratic states.  The authors find little evidence that foreign debt or export 
dependence influence the deforestation rate. Although deforestation continues to pose 
pressing and potentially irreversible environmental risks, there is evidence of self-
corrective ecological and modernization processes inherent in development that act to 
mitigate these risks.  
5
                                                            
4 Put in easily understandable everyday language, the Kuznets curve rests on the idea, proposed by 
Kuznets, 1955, that developmental outcomes (like inequality) are a non-linear function of development 
levels 
5 Interested readers are also referred to Easterly, 2000, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Heshmati and 
Tausch, 2007 for further reference. 
. The Kuznets curve of economic inequality (Barro, 2000) or 
environmental degradation (Selden and Song, 1994; Stern, 2004; Stern, Common and 
Barboer, 1996) must be just as mentioned in this context as the study by Biswas and 
Ram, 1986 on military expenditures; Ram, 1997 on tropical climate; the sociological 
study by Crenshaw and Robison, on population, demography, pre-industrial heritage 
and socio-linguistic integration as factors of economic growth (see also the essays on 
demography, the economic size of nations, and geography (absolute latitude) into 
account - see also Easterly, 2000; Poe and Tate, 1994); Ram, 1986 on government 
expenditures; and the sociological essay by Scanlan, 2004, on women in government 
on food security and social development (see also UNDP, HDR, 1995; furthermore, 
from the ever more growing important perspective of feminism and good governance: 
Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009; Logo, 2008; Matt, 2010; McDowell, 1992; 
Rankin, 2002; Rothstein and Teorell; as well as the survey on women in government 9 
 
and the welfare state in Orloff, 1996). We also should mention culture (membership of 
a country in the Islamic Conference; see the vast social science debate following 
Huntington, 1993; by contrast: Amin, 1997). A non-exhaustive more detailed account 
of earlier important studies is given in Table 1b of the Appendix of this paper. 
Confronted with all this startling variety of contradictory statements on the drivers and 
bottlenecks of international development, we now should present a survey of the 
empirical methods used in this study. 
 
3. Methods and measurement 
To start with, we have made our data for our calculations completely and freely 
available on the Internet, so that the global research community can have free access to 
the original data and the opportunity to check our results or to conduct new research 
(http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017). This internet site offers not only the 
Microsoft EXCEL data (Table 1 of the EXCEL file) and a list of the sources (Table 2 
of the EXCEL file), but also a codebook in PDF format. A brief description of the 
smart development data, calculated from that data source, is also contained in the 
Appendix Table 4 of this work. 
Our investigation duly acknowledges many of the key determinants of economic 
growth, mentioned in the economic literature, like current shares of the country’s 
inhabitants in total world population, calculated from UNDP data; the famous Heritage 
Foundation 2000 Economic Freedom Score; absolute geographical latitude, adapted 
from Easterly’s growth theory; the UNDP figures for long-term annual population 
percentage  growth rate, 1975-2005; the trade-off between development level and 
development performance, otherwise also known in economics as ‘conditional 
convergence’ (ln GDP per capita; ln GDP per capita ^2); the simple Huntingtonian fact 
of whether a country is a Muslim country, to be measured by the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) Membership or by Muslim population share (Nationmaster); 
UNDP data on the simple geographical fact of population density (based on the CIA’s 
World  Fact book); UNDP data on public education expenditure per GDP; and the 
UNDP education index, combining the enrolment rates at the primary, secondary and 
tertiary education levels. We also take into account UNDP figures on military 
expenditures per GDP and the openly available CIA data on military personnel rate, 
which are key variables of contemporary political science international relations theory 
and peace research. In our analysis, we also show the theoretical and practical 
(political) potential of the following two drivers of development, which are somewhat a 
‘terra incognita Australis’ in the hitherto existing macro-sociological debate, like 
migration and European (Monetary) Union membership. 
To gain a real empirical knowledge under scrutiny here, we first developed UNDP-type 
indicators from current standard international comparative, cross-national social 
science data on six dimensions of development and on their combined performance. 
We then show the non-linear standard OLS regression trade-off between ecological 
footprint per capita and its square and these six dimensions of development (and the 
overall development performance) indices. The residuals from these regressions are our 
new measure of smart development: with a minimum of ecological footprint one has to 
achieve a maximum of democracy, or economic growth, or gender equality, or human 10 
 
development, or research and development, or social cohesion (and the combination of 
all of them). We then look at the drivers and bottlenecks of smart development. Can the 
accumulated knowledge of cross-national development research be applied to this new 
question writing? We use standard comparative cross-national ‘development 
accounting’ data, which operationalize standard econometric drivers of economic 
growth, and compare their weight in explaining ‘smart development’ with the results 
for the clash of civilization models, political integration theories, feminist theories, 
migration theories, and peace research approaches to global development. We also 
analyze the possible explanatory weight of  sociological dependency and world systems 
theories and later globalization critical research, and also do not overlook in our choice 
of independent variables with a possible effect on the dependent variables – smart 
development - the ‘small is beautiful paradigm’ in the tradition of Schumacher. 
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (175 countries) was 
determined by the availability of a fairly good data series for these independent 
variables (if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data for the middle of the first decade of 
the new millennium). In the final regressions, we applied the ‘list wise deletion of 
missing values’ routine (i.e. only entering countries with complete data into the 
statistical analysis).  
The statistical design of our study is thus based on the usual, OLS standard regression 
analysis of the ‘kitchen sink type’ (Durlauf et al., 2008; Hertz, Hebert, and Landon, 
1994) of economic growth and economic, social and political performance in the 
research tradition of Barro, 2003.
6
The statistical design of our study is based on the usual, SPSS-PAWS XVIII
 Surveying the vast econometric literature on the 
subject of the possible drivers and bottlenecks of the EU-2020 process and overall 
development performance of a given country, one indeed finds support for the inclusion 
of geographic and demographic variables in the comparative analysis of development 
success or failure.  Our list is thus corresponding to international research standard 
praxis in the discipline of general ‘development accounting’ (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2003; Dixon, 1987; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 1989; Durlauf et al., 2008; Fain, 1997; 
Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Moon and Dixon, 1992; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b; 
Shandra et al., 2009; Tausch and Prager, 1993). Compared to a recent approach on the 
subject (Knight and Rosa, 2011), we do include globalization-oriented variables as 
well, and not just levels of GDP, winters, social trust, democracy, inequality, and Latin 
America, former USSR, Africa, and Asia as ‘dummy variables’ (Knight and Rosa, 
2011). There is a wide and well-established research tradition in international 
comparative sociology to include globalization-related drivers of environmental decay 
(Jorgenson, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). To exclude such variables and to 
introduce instead four geographically determined dummy variables (Latin America, 
former USSR, Africa, and Asia, as was done by Knight and Rosa, 2011) does not 
necessarily increase the theoretical and predictive power of analysis. 
7
                                                            
6 To our knowledge, the term ‘kitchen sink regression’, commonly used in econometrics of economic 
growth, was re-introduced in more recent standard social science journal vocabulary in Laver and 
Shepsle, 1999. 
 ordinary 
least square standard regression of the ‘kitchen sink type’. The term was re-introduced 
in more recent standard social science journal vocabulary in Laver and Shepsle, 1999. 
7 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/products/statistics/  11 
 
Prior stepwise regression procedures selected the significant among the total list of 26 
available predictors. Among the many international studies, applying such a research 
design, we find Hertz, Hebert, and Landon, 1994. This study analyzed the effects of 
independent variables including dietary factors, medical resource availability, gross 
national product (GNP/capita), literacy rates, growth in the labor force, and provision 
of sanitation facilities and safe water on infant and maternal mortality rates and life 
expectancy at birth. The study fitted a series of general linear models for each of the 
three dependent variables
8
Since our article does not feature primarily on ecological footprint, but on a variety of 
measures of ‘smart development’, which are mathematically derived from the logic of 
the Happy Planet Index (see also Ng, 2008a and 2008b; Veenhoven, 1996), it suffices 
to say here that ecological footprint (g ha /cap)
.  
9, is indeed a one-catch all-indicator of 
ecological strain, caused by human activity. Ecological footprint and its measurement 
cannot be further debated in the framework of article and at this stage must be regarded 
as a ‘given’ (for studies about the logic and determinants of footprint per capita see also 
Dietz et al., 2007 and 2009). It should be enough to state here that it is measure of the 
amount of land required to provide for all their resource requirements plus the amount 
of vegetated land required to sequester (absorb) all their CO2 emissions and the CO2 
emissions embodied in the products individuals consume. This figure is expressed in 
units of ‘global hectares’. In 2005, the per capita footprint for the rich OECD nations 
was 6.0 global hectares
10
(1) 
. The other variables are then compared to the footprint, which 
was used by a society to achieve a given standard of democracy, economic growth, 
gender equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion. 
We should also remind our readers here of the fact that the Happy Planet Index 
Organization measures the Happy Planet Index on the basis of the global life 
satisfaction (Happy Life Years), which have to be maximized in relationship to the 
‘ecological price’ of happiness, ecological footprint.  
It is then of course very tempting to calculate – in a Schumacherian tradition – the 
‘environmental price’ of different development processes, like democracy, economic 
growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, and social 
cohesion. The Happy Planet Organization calculates the HPI in the following way: 
( ) β α × + = ) /( ) ( i i i EFPC HLYE HPI  
where Happy Life Years (HLYE) is obtained as the product of life expectancy (LE) and 
average life satisfaction (LS) index. In its currently used formula, the Happy Planet 
Organization adds a constant (α) to ecological footprint. The result of the division: 
[Happy Life Years divided by Ecological Footprint plus the constant (α)]  is then 
multiplied by another, equally arbitrarily chosen constant (β) to normalize the 
efficiency index. In the Happy Planet Organization formula, the constants have the 
following numerical values: (α) = 3.35 and (β) = 6.42.   
                                                            
8 It emerged that the per cent of households without sanitation facilities showed the strongest association 
with all three dependent variables: life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, and maternal mortality 
rate 
9 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/  
10 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/ 12 
 
The highest global HPI score is that of Costa Rica (76.1 out of 100). Of the 10 best 
performing countries of the world, nine are in Latin America.
11 But unfortunately, the 
Happy Planet Organization’s straightforward and simple methodology overlooks 
advances in the social sciences, which long ago already developed appropriate 
methodologies to relate life quality variables – like life expectancy – to GDP per capita 
or energy consumption levels in empirical, and non-linear mathematical formulations. 
The latter captures much better than the above simple equation the underlying non-
linear tradeoffs between ‘energy consumption and/or environmental strain’ and ‘life 
quality’ (Goldstein, 1985). Goldstein’s empirically developed idea that basic human 
needs indicators –  like life expectancy –  are  a non-linear function of development 
levels has been so widely received in the social science literature that is has become a 
real international standard nowadays (see Afxentiou, 1990a, 1990b; Anand and 
Ravillion, 1993; Anson, 1988, 1991; Cheng, 1989; Dixon, 1987; Dixon and Moon, 
1986, 1989; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Kakwani, 1993, 1995; Khan, 1991; 
King, 1998; Knight and Rosa, 2011; Mazumdar, 1996, 2000; Moon and Dixon, 1992; 
Newman and Thomson, 1989; Rudra, 2009; Tausch and Prager, 1993). The neglect of 
such a basic non-linear function (whatever its concrete mathematical formulation
12) is a 
major shortcoming of the currently used Happy Planet Index calculation. The global 
public health research tradition, too, produced massive evidence on the cross-national 
determinants of life expectancy and other life quality variables (to quote but a few 
studies: Wilkinson, 1992; Wilkinson and Picket, 2006; Tausch, 2010). This growing 
methodological convergence of the social sciences, geography and earth sciences, and 
public health research on predictors of life quality at different stages of development 
should be taken into account in this article (Fain, et al. 1997; Mostafa, 2010a and 
2010b; Mostafa and Nataraajan, 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 2007b, Shandra, Leckband, 
McKinney and London, 2009). Graph  1  depicts the trade-off between ecological 
footprint and happy life years; the (standardized) residuals in our graph are a 
reformulated Happy Planet Index: 
Graph 1: The non-linear relationship between Happy Life Years (HLYE, vertical Y) 
and ecological footprint (horizontal X), n=140 countries in 2005. 
 
                                                            
11 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/ 
12 The most often encountered formulation in the literature is a double logarithmic expression, based on 
the natural logarithm of development level/energy consumption and its square.  13 
 
 
Variable         Coefficient   Std Error 
Ecological Footprint per capita     10.541∗∗∗   1.313 
Ecological Footprint per capita^2     −0.677∗∗∗   0.147 
Constant          19.631∗∗∗   2.246 
 
N =            140 
Adj. R^2 =           54.1% 
F-test =            83.081 
p-value =           0.000 
Significance level: *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001;  
In a similar vein, we investigated the non-linear trade-offs between ecological footprint 
and the combined UNDP type indices for six dimensions of development (see Table 2), 
derived from freely available current cross-national, comparative data: 
Table 2:  the combined  six  components, measuring development, and the overall 
indicators, combining 26 variables 
democracy  Combined Failed States Index 
democracy  Civil and Political Liberties violations 
democracy  Corruption avoidance measure 
democracy  Democracy measure 
democracy  Global tolerance index 
democracy  Rule of law 
economic growth  Crisis Performance Factor 
economic growth  economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 
economic growth  economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 
economic growth  economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
Gender equality  closing economic gender gap 
Gender equality  closing educational gender gap 
Gender equality  closing health and survival gender gap 
Gender equality  closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 
Gender equality  closing political gender gap 
Gender equality  gender empowerment index value 
human development  Infant mortality 2005 
human development  female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female 
human development  Human development index (HDI) value 2004 
human development  Life Expectancy (years) 
human development  Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
R&D  Country share in top world 500 Universities 
R&D  per capita world class universities 
R&D  tertiary enrollment 
social cohesion  quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20% 
social cohesion  unemployment rate 




each dimension equally 
overall 26 development index, based on six dimensions 
 
Graphs 2a–2h  show  the trade-off between ecological footprint and ‘smart 
development’, measured for the various dimensions (democracy, economic growth, 
gender equality, human development, research and development, social cohesion, and 
the two differently combined overall measurement scales). Only the scatterplot for 
ecological footprint and ‘social cohesion’ suggests a weaker relationship, all the other 
relationships are considerable. The overall development performance, democracy, 
gender equality, human development, research and development are a clear non-linear, 
inverted U-shaped function of ecological footprint per capita, while economic growth 
and also social cohesion first decrease and then increase with rising levels of ecological 
footprint per capita.  
Graph 2: Ecological footprint and general development performance – the non-linear 
tradeoffs 
Graph 2a: Ecological footprint and the general development performance index, based 
on an equal weighting of its 26 components 
 
 
Graph 2b: Ecological footprint and the general development performance index, based 




Graph 2c: Ecological footprint and democratic performance (6 components combined) 
 
 






















As we already explained, the hitherto existing calculations of the HPI
13
σ ˆ / ) ˆ ( i i i E HLY HLYE SDP − =
, provided by 
the Happy Planet Organization, are merely based on simple arithmetical principles.  
Following Heintz, 1972 we propose as an alternative method a residual method, and 
calculate our smart development indicators as the standardized residuals from Graph 2. 
The standardized residual values are computed as observed minus predicted 
development outcomes divided by the square root of the residual mean square (see 
Appendix, Table 1 and 2): 
(2)    
High positive outliers  imply a very high smart development performance, while 
countries below the trend line are the countries with a low smart development 
performance. Having established a residual-based smart Development Indicator family, 
we now can look more realistically at the cross-national determinants of smart 
development performance.  
 
4. Results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’ 
The image of social realities suggested upon a very first inspection of smart 
development performance values around the globe would suggest a Friedrich August 
Hayek vision (Hayek, 1945, 1989) of markets, inequality and a free society interacting 
with one another. There should be no blocks against inequalities in the name of 
whatever ‘social justice’, explaining then the phenomenal success of the unequal Latin 
American societies on the parameters of smart development (see especially, the global 
rankings of smart development in Table 3 of the Appendix). A the same time, the high-
equality performers in global society (quintile share of less than 5.0) with a relatively 
high per-capita income are at the same time bad performers on the new smart 
development scales. Notably enough, several of these countries are members of the 
European Union and traditional developed western welfare states. This very first glance 
at the data would suggest a complete turn-around from the ‘European social model’ 
(Tausch and Ghymers, 2006) in favor of a high-inequality, open to globalization ‘Latin 
American model’ or Philippine model as the best way to achieve a good ‘smart 
development’ performance. However,  such a first glance completely overlooks the 
massive available evidence about world economic openness and the failure of ‘smart 
development’. 
As to multivariate analysis, first preliminary stepwise regression procedures with mean 
substitution of missing variables revealed a re-current pattern of the importance and 
predictive capability robustness of the chosen variables among the 26 independent 
variables with a theoretically well-plausible greater and significant effect on the 
dependent variables (the  six  component indicators of development and the overall 
development performance indicators). The final results were achieved by forward 
multiple regression based on list wise deletion of missing values, and based exclusively 
on the significant predictors from the prior preliminary stepwise regressions. We first 
                                                            
13 Although we presume the main contemporary global environment indicators to be known, we refer our 
readers especially to the very comprehensive Yale/Columbia environmental data series, available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ and http://epi.yale.edu/Home . The new ‘grammar’ of the global 
footprint discourse can be found at http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/glossary/ . 18 
 
present, variable by variable, and driver by driver, and bottleneck by bottleneck, the 
significant results of our multiple regression analyses (regression coefficients and their 
significance): 
Table 3: The significant drivers and bottlenecks of smart development 
Independent Variable  dependent variable  Beta  error 
probability 
% women in government, all levels (feminist 
theory, stressing the need to feminize structures of 
government) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0.185  0.045 
% women in government, all levels (feminist 
theory, stressing the need to feminize structures of 
government) 
Smart democracy  0.196  0.007 
% women in government, all levels (feminist 
theory, stressing the need to feminize structures of 
government) 
Smart gender justice  0.300  0.001 
% world population (Amin’s five monopolies of 
power) 
Smart human development  0.152  0.061 
% world population (Amin’s five monopolies of 
power) 
Happy Life Years  0.161  0.060 
% world population (Amin’s five monopolies of 
power) 
Smart economic growth  0.261  0.002 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its absence is 
explained either by Amin’s critique of rent-seeking 
seeking in the periphery versus conventional neo-
liberal theories of economic growth) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0.336  0.002 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its absence is 
explained either by Amin’s critique of rent-seeking 
seeking in the periphery versus conventional neo-
liberal theories of economic growth) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
0.402  0.000 
2000 Economic Freedom Score (its absence is 
explained either by Amin’s critique of rent-seeking 
seeking in the periphery versus conventional neo-
liberal theories of economic growth) 
Smart democracy  0.457  0.000 
Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-
Orient’ model) 
Smart economic growth  -0.234  0.006 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
(Paul Israel Singer’s dependency theory) 
Smart R&D  -0.253  0.007 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
(Paul Israel Singer’s dependency theory) 
Smart social cohesion  -0.248  0.006 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 
(Amin’s theory about the role of migration) 
Smart democracy  -0.348  0.000 
military expenditures per GDP (quantitative 
dependency and peace research approaches) 
Happy Life Years  -0.245  0.004 
military expenditures per GDP (quantitative 
dependency and peace research approaches) 
Smart gender justice  -0.204  0.018 
military expenditures per GDP (quantitative 
dependency and peace research approaches) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
-0.191  0.021 
military expenditures per GDP (quantitative 
dependency and peace research approaches) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
-0.166  0.074 19 
 
military personnel rate ln (quantitative dependency 
and peace research approaches) 
Smart democracy  -0.221  0.002 
MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 
(Bornschier’s dependency theory, stressing the 
importance of MNC headquarter status in 
international society) 
Smart R&D  0.479  0.000 
Muslim population share per total population 
(Amin’s critique of Islamism, implicitly expecting a 
negative trade-off with development performance 
versus Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model, 
expecting a transfer of growth and productive 
activities to the global East and South) 
Smart gender justice  -0.396  0.000 
Muslim population share per total population 
(Amin’s critique of Islamism, implicitly expecting a 
negative trade-off with development performance 
versus Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’ model, 
expecting a transfer of growth and productive 
activities to the global East and South) 
Smart economic growth  0.313  0.000 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + 
import-share per GDP) (Amin’s conception of the 
role of the peripheries) 
Smart R&D  -0.552  0.000 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + 
import-share per GDP) (Amin’s conception of the 
role of the peripheries) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
-0.222  0.019 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + 
import-share per GDP) (Amin’s conception of the 
role of the peripheries) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
-0.170  0.048 
population density (José Carlos Mariategui’s 
dependency theory) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0.214  0.010 
public education expenditure per GNP (human 
capital approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm versus neo-liberal 
approaches, featuring a ‘crowding out’ 
phenomenon) 
Smart social cohesion  -0.270  0.003 
public education expenditure per GNP (human 
capital approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm versus neo-liberal 
approaches, featuring a ‘crowding out’ 
phenomenon) 
Smart human development  -0.196  0.024 
public education expenditure per GNP (human 
capital approaches in the tradition of the UNDP 
versus Kalecki/Steindl paradigm versus neo-liberal 
approaches, featuring a ‘crowding out’ 
phenomenon) 
Smart R&D  0.235  0.010 
UNDP education index (human capital approaches 
in the tradition of the UNDP versus Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0.198  0.036 
UNDP education index (human capital approaches 
in the tradition of the UNDP versus Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm) 
Smart human development  0.478  0.000 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
Smart economic growth  -0.262  0.002 20 
 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighting 
equally the six component 
dimensions 
0.177  0.064 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
overall smart development 
index, based on 26 
variables, weighted equally 
0.208  0.016 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
Smart R&D  0.229  0.017 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
Smart gender justice  0.241  0.007 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
Happy Life Years  0.288  0.002 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
(conventional center-periphery models about the 
negative consequences of the brain drain versus 
‘new migration theories’, underlining the positive 
effects of worker remittances on migration sending 
countries) 
Smart human development  0.352  0.000 
Years of membership in the EU, 2010 (Amin’s 
theory about the importance of European integration 
as a counterweight to US dominance in the world 
system) 
Smart democracy  0.183  0.006 
 
The following independent variables wield only ‘good’ and positive effects on smart 
development: 
•  % women in government, all levels (feminist theory; three effects positive; zero 
effects negative) 
•  % world population (Amin’s five monopolies of power; three effects positive; 
zero effects negative) 
•  Economic Freedom Score (Amin’s critique of rent-seeking;  three  effects 
positive; zero effects negative) 
•  MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP (Bornschier’s dependency theory; 
one effect positive; zero effects negative) 21 
 
•  population density (José Carlos Mariategui’s dependency theory;  one  effect 
positive; zero effects negative) 
•  UNDP education index (Steindl/Kalecki-paradigm; two effects positive; zero 
effects negative) 
•  Years of membership in the EU (Amin’s theory about the role of integration; 
one effect positive; zero effects negative) 
The following predictors wielded only negative consequences on smart development: 
•  Absolute latitude (Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Re-Orient’  model;  zero  effects 
positive; one effect negative) 
•  Annual population growth rate (%) (Paul Israel Singer’s dependency theory; 
zero effects positive; two effects negative) 
•  Immigration  share of total  population (%) (Amin’s theory about the role of 
migration; zero effects positive; one effect negative) 
•  military expenditures per GDP (dependency and peace research approaches; 
zero effects positive; four effects negative) 
•  military personnel rate (dependency and peace research approaches; zero effects 
positive; one effect negative) 
•  Openness-Index (export-share per GDP minus import-share per GDP) (Amin’s 
conception of the role of the peripheries; zero effects positive, three effects 
negative) 
The following variables wielded mixed results: 
•  worker remittance inflows as % of GDP (six effects positive; one effect 
negative) 
•  Muslim population shares (one effect positive; one effect negative) 
•  public education expenditure per GNP (one effect positive; two effects 
negative) 
The power, wielded by the predictors  
•  workers remittances (six positive effects);  
•  feminization of power structure (three positive effects) 
•  share of world population (three positive effects) 
•  economic freedom (three positive effects) 
•  world economic openness index (three negative effects),  
•  military expenditures (four negative effects);  
seems to be overwhelming.  
In the following, we will present, equation by equation, the results of our research. 
Table 4 shows the significant drivers and bottlenecks of Happy Planet performance, i.e. 
happy life years in relationship to the ecological footprint of a society used. The z-
standardized residuals from Graph 2 are well-explained; our equation is based on 103 
countries with complete data. Our equation explains 29% of total variance, the F-value 
for the entire equation is 9.339, and the error probability is 0.000. The constant is -
124.628 and is significant. There is a clear ‘Kuznets’ curve at work (see also Stern, 
2004). But the shape of the curve contradicts much of the earlier debate on the subject: 
with rising per capita incomes, problem solving capacities first increase and then 22 
 
decrease. The larger states in the world system, having a larger share of global 
population, are much better able to achieve a good happy life years performance at 
relatively low ecological costs, measured in ecological footprints than smaller nations. 
This clearly contradicts the ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy in the tradition of Kohr and 
Schumacher. Military expenditures are a clear additional burden on an ecologically 
viable happy planet performance, while societies, depending on worker remittances, 
clearly manage to perform better on this scale than other societies around the globe.  
Table 4: The drivers and bottlenecks of Happy Planet performance  
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  -124.628  42.647    -2.922  0.004 
% world population  0.596  0.313  0.161  1.904  0.060 
ln GDP per capita  26.062  10.069  3.136  2.588  0.011 
ln GDP per capita ^2  -1.309  0.584  -2.731  -2.241  0.027 
military expenditures per GDP  -1.098  0.376  -0.245  -2.922  0.004 
worker remittance inflows as % 
of GDP 
0.420  0.133  0.288  3.153  0.002 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  29.000  102  9.339  0.000   
 
In a similar fashion, we can establish in Table 5 that in the 101 countries with complete 
data, smart overall development, as defined in Graph 2a of this work, is explained to 
37% by our model. The F-test for the entire equation is 9.392, the error probability is 
0.000. The constant is -2.486 and is significant. The ten countries of the world system, 
best combining the performance on our 26 development indicators and avoiding 
ecological footprint at the same time are the Philippines; Sri Lanka; Costa Rica; 
Sweden; Jamaica; Dominican Republic; Finland; Peru; Netherlands; and Trinidad and 
Tobago. The ten worst performers on this scale are Sudan; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Central African Republic; United Arab Emirates; Niger; Kuwait; Chad; Zimbabwe; 
Burundi; and Hong Kong, China (SAR). Feminism in power, economic freedom, 
population density, the UNDP education index as well as the receipt of worker 
remittances all significantly contribute towards a smart overall development, while high 
military expenditures and a high world economic openness are a bottleneck for ‘smart 
overall development’.  
Table 5: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart overall development  
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  -2.486  0.533    -4.666  0.000 
% women in government. all 
levels 
0.025  0.012  0.185  2.027  0.045 
2000 Economic Freedom Score  0.031  0.010  0.336  3.239  0.002 
military expenditures per GDP  -0.076  0.032  -0.191  -2.345  0.021 
Openness-Index. 1990 (export-
share per GDP + import-share per 
GDP) 
-0.004  0.002  -0.170  -2.007  0.048 23 
 
population density  0.002  0.001  0.214  2.612  0.010 
UNDP education index  0.945  0.445  0.198  2.123  0.036 
worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP 
0.027  0.011  0.208  2.459  0.016 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  37.000  100  9.392  0.000   
 
Also, it emerges that the results about the drivers of overall smart development 
performance are similar to the ones, reported in Table 6, if we calculate the overall 
development performance by weighting equally its six component indices and only 
then calculating the overall final country performance score, and not, unlike in Table 5, 
being the sum of the equally weighted 26 original component indices (as to the trade-
off with ecological footprint, see Graph 2b of this work). Economic freedom, and 
received worker remittances per GDP again emerge as the ’drivers’ of smart 
development (Table 6), while the bottlenecks of smart overall development 
performance are again military expenditures per GDP and world economic openness. 
This time, the adjusted R^2 is 19%, and the equation is based on 102 countries with 
complete data. The F-test for the entire equation is 6.908, and the equation is significant 
at the 0.000-level. The constant is -1.469 and is significant. 
Table 6: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart overall development, based on an index, 
which weights the six dimensions equally 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  -1.469  0.536    -2.741  0.007 
2000 Economic Freedom Score  0.035  0.008  0.402  4.158  0.000 
military expenditures per GDP  -0.061  0.034  -0.166  -1.808  0.074 
Openness-Index. 1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
-0.005  0.002  -0.222  -2.376  0.019 
worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP 
0.021  0.011  0.177  1.871  0.064 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  19.000  101  6.908  0.000   
 
Table 7 is an invitation to consider the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart democracy’ 
(see also Graph 2c of this work). The ten smartest democracies of our globe are Costa 
Rica; Netherlands; Jamaica; Chile; Sweden; India; Benin; Madagascar; Finland; and 
Germany; these are the countries of the world system, best combining democratic 
performance and avoiding ecological footprint. The worst performers are Sudan; 
Belarus; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; United Arab Emirates; Uzbekistan; Lebanon; Hong 
Kong, China (SAR); Azerbaijan; and Myanmar. The adjusted R^2 of our equation is 
48.6%, and the F-value for the entire equation is 25.743, and the error p for the 
equation is .000. It is based on 132 countries with complete data. The drivers of smart 
democracy are feminized structures of government, economic freedom, and years of 
membership in the European Union. The significant bottlenecks of smart democracy 24 
 
are high military personnel ratios, and a high share  of immigrant population. The 
constant of our equation is -2.037, and it is significant. 
Table 7: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart democracy 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  -2.037  0.409    -4.978  0.000 
% women in government. all levels  0.029  0.011  0.196  2.753  0.007 
2000 Economic Freedom Score  0.041  0.007  0.457  5.826  0.000 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)  -0.334  0.105  -0.221  -3.162  0.002 
Immigration - Share of population 
2005 (%) 
-0.031  0.007  -0.348  -4.549  0.000 
Years of membership in the EU. 
2010 
0.014  0.005  0.183  2.806  0.006 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  48.600  131  25.743  0.000   
 
Our next Table, Table 8, analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart economic 
growth’ combing high economic growth with low rates of ecological footprint per 
capita (see also Graph 2d of this work). The IMF data for economic growth in 2010 as 
well as the Happy Planet Organization data on ecological footprint suggest that the 10 
best performers were China; Azerbaijan; Botswana; Uzbekistan; Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the); Bhutan; Sudan; Mongolia; Ethiopia; and Lebanon; while the worst 
performers with the worst ‘cocktail’ of slow economic growth  in relation to their 
ecological footprint per capita were Zimbabwe; Moldova; Lithuania; Latvia; Ukraine; 
Jamaica; Haiti; Armenia; Tajikistan; and Madagascar. Our equation about ‘smart 
growth’ is based on 111 countries with complete data, the R^2 is 25.2%, the F-value is 
10.243, and the error probability of the entire equation is 0.000. The constant is 0.195, 
and it is not significant. Population size in relation to the global population as well as 
Muslim population share per total population are the significant drivers of smart 
development in the global system today, while absolute latitude (i.e. countries in the far 
North and South of the world system) as well as nations depending on worker 
remittances are the bottlenecks of ‘smart growth’ today. This again suggests, as we 
already hinted at in our theoretical introduction above about the theory of Andre 
Gunder Frank, 1999, the tectonic shifts in the geographical structures of global growth 
today, away from the countries of the ‘North Atlantic arena’ towards the nations of the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific, which also thwart the smart growth efforts of the 
countries exporting their workforce to the hitherto existing centers  of the global 
economy.  
Table 8: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart economic growth (2010) 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  0.195  0.178    1.092  0.277 
% world population  0.099  0.031  0.261  3.149  0.002 
Absolute latitude  -0.013  0.005  -0.234  -2.817  0.006 
worker remittance inflows as % of  -0.035  0.011  -0.262  -3.108  0.002 25 
 
GDP 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
0.009  0.002  0.313  3.717  0.000 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  25.200  110  10.243  0.000   
 
Table 9 of our study analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of smart gender justice. We 
are comparing the given amount of gender equality in a society with the amount of 
resources (ecological footprint), needed to sustain it (see Graph 2e). The global best 
performers on this equation, how to achieve a maximum of gender justice with a 
minimum of ecological footprint, are the Philippines; South Africa; Finland; Norway; 
Mozambique; Sweden; Iceland; Kyrgyzstan; Sri Lanka; and Uganda. The worst balance 
sheet on this item of combing ‘lilac’ gender policies and ‘green’ issues (minimizing 
ecological footprint per capita) are Yemen; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates; 
Turkey; Pakistan; Chad; Iran; Kuwait; Korea (Republic of); and Egypt. Our equation, 
based on the 93 countries with complete data, explains 39% of total variance, achieves 
an F-value of 15.712 and an error probability of the entire equation of 0.000. The 
insignificant constant has the value of -0.034. Women in government and worker 
remittances per GDP are the significant drivers of smart gender justice, while high 
military expenditures and the Muslim population share per total population are the 
major variables, to be interpreted as ‘bottlenecks’ of smart gender justice. 
Table 9: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart gender justice 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probabilit
y 
Constant  -0.034  0.213    -0.161  0.873 
% women in government. all levels  0.044  0.013  0.300  3.364  0.001 
military expenditures per GDP  -0.087  0.036  -0.204  -2.403  0.018 
worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP 
0.035  0.013  0.241  2.764  0.007 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0.010  0.003  -0.396  -4.153  0.000 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  39.000  92  15.712  0.000   
 
Table 10 looks at the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart human development’. Which 
are the countries best combining the task of a maximum of ‘human development’ with 
a minimum of ecological footprint per capita (see also Graph 2f of this work)? The ten 
best practice countries on this scale are Jamaica; Philippines; Cuba; Sri Lanka; Costa 
Rica; Vietnam; Dominican Republic; Indonesia; Colombia; and Moldova; while all the 
worst performers are located in the African continent, comprising the following 
countries: Botswana; Namibia; Central African Rep,; Burkina Faso; Niger; Sierra 
Leone; Zimbabwe; Mali; Angola; and Chad. Our equation explains 29.9% of the total 
variance of ‘smart development’ and is based on the analysis of the 115 countries with 26 
 
complete data; the F-value is 13.183 and the error p of the entire equation is 0.000. The 
constant, which is weakly significant, has a value of -1.657. The drivers of ‘smart 
human development’ are the share of a country’s population in world population, 
indicating the relative size of a nation, the UNDP education index, measuring the levels 
of education in a given country, and worker remittance inflows as % of GDP. The 
bottleneck of ‘smart human development’ is constituted by the crowding-out effect of 
public education expenditures on human development.  
Table 10: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart human development 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  -1.657  0.348    -4.760  0.000 
% world population  0.055  0.029  0.152  1.894  0.061 
public education expenditure per 
GNP 
-0.097  0.042  -0.196  -2.283  0.024 
UNDP education index  2.437  0.430  0.478  5.666  0.000 
worker remittance inflows as % 
of GDP 
0.044  0.010  0.352  4.461  0.000 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  29.900  114  13.183  0.000   
 
Table 11  analyses the drivers and bottlenecks of smart R&D performance.  The 
equation is based on 93 countries with complete data, the R^2 is 33%, the F-value is 
10.058, and the error probability of the entire equation is 0.000. The constant, which is 
not significant, is 0.326. The drivers of smart R&D performance, combining the R&D 
record with a minimum of ecological footprint (see also Graph 2g of this work), are the 
dominant position of a country on the global markets, expressed in the indicator 
multinational corporation outward investments per GDP, the public education 
expenditure, and worker remittance inflows as a % of GDP. The significant bottlenecks 
against a smart R&D performance are population pressure (the annual population 
growth rate) and world economic openness. According to our indicator, the best 
performing countries are the United States (because of its overwhelming performance 
in tertiary education and research, its high ecological footprint notwithstanding); 
Sweden; New Zealand; Finland; Israel; United Kingdom; Netherlands; Norway; 
Switzerland; and Kyrgyzstan. The worst performers are: United Arab Emirates; 
Luxembourg; Kuwait; Namibia; Botswana; Cyprus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Macedonia; Uruguay; and the Czech Republic. 
Table 11: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart R&D 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
Constant  0.326  0.327    0.998  0.321 
Annual population growth rate. 
1975-2005 (%) 
-0.248  0.089  -0.253  -2.782  0.007 
MNC outward investments 
(stock) per GDP 
0.043  0.009  0.479  4.731  0.000 
Openness-Index. 1990 (export-
share per GDP + import-share per 
-0.014  0.002  -0.552  -5.473  0.000 27 
 
GDP) 
public education expenditure per 
GNP 
0.136  0.051  0.235  2.646  0.010 
worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP 
0.050  0.021  0.229  2.438  0.017 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  33.000  92  10.058  0.000   
 
Our last result is presented in Table 12. It features on the preconditions of ‘smart 
social cohesion’, combining a relatively high social cohesion with a relatively low 
ecological footprint (see also Graph 2h). Our equation is based on an analysis of 120 
countries with complete data, the adjusted R^2 is just 8.7%, and the F-value is 6.771; 
and the error probability of the entire equation is .002. The constant is 0.824 and is 
significant. There are two significant bottlenecks and no positive drivers of smart social 
cohesion  –  annual  population growth (population pressure) and the crowding-out 
effects of public education expenditures per GDP. The best results on our indicator are 
achieved by several less developed and or (former) communist or left wing regime 
countries as well as nations with a known record of relatively egalitarian development 
policies (South Korea), with the entire group comprising: Chad; Uzbekistan; Rwanda; 
Belarus; Laos; Cuba; Benin; Tajikistan; Korea (Republic of); and Thailand. The worst 
record of combing social cohesion with low ecological footprints was found in 
Djibouti; Namibia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Central African Republic; Sierra Leone; 
Botswana; Macedonia; Bolivia; South Africa; and Colombia. 
Table 12: Drivers and bottlenecks of smart social cohesion 
Independent Variable  B  standard 
error 
Beta  t-value  error 
probability 
 
Constant  0.824  0.206    4.009  0.000 
Annual population growth rate. 
1975-2005 (%) 
-0.152  0.055  -0.248  -2.775  0.006 
public education expenditure per 
GNP 
-0.102  0.034  -0.270  -3.013  0.003 
memorandum item: statistical 
properties of the equation 
adj R^2  df  F  error probability 
of the entire 
equation 
 
  8.700  119  6.771  0.002   
 
5. Discussion 
Knight and Rosa, 2011 compared the ecological footprint per capita and average life 
satisfaction (as a measure of subjective well-being). Based on maximum likelihood 
estimations, they tested the effects of climate, political, economic, and social factors on 
environmental efficiency of well-being (EEWB)  with a sample of 105 countries. 
Knight and Rosa found a negative quadratic effect of economic development on 28 
 
EEWB, a negative effect of income inequality, and a positive effect of social capital 
(based on social trust data, contained in the World Values Survey)
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First of all, the dependency and world systems paradigm by Samir Amin comes to our 
mind. As correctly predicted by Samir Amin, the big countries with huge population 
resources today are favored in their smart economic growth, their Happy Life Years, 
and their smart human development. As correctly expected by Amin, peripheral rent 
seeking is a burden and its absence, measured by economic freedom, is an asset among 
the forces, shaping international development today, especially for smart democracy, 
and the overall smart development index (both formulations, used in this essay). In 
addition, Amin correctly stresses the necessity for European integration –  and the 
positive effects of years of EU membership on smart democracy confirm Euro-
optimism. He correctly analyses the enormous transfer of resources from the center to 
the periphery, brought about by migration, with the huge statistical observed effects of 
received worker remittances on smart human development, Happy Life Years, smart 
gender justice, smart R&D, and both formulations of the smart development index 
justifying his assumption. Amin’s dependency theory correctly predicts the very 
.  
Our residuals-based reformulation of smart development realistically captures the 
trade-off between Global Ecological Footprint per capita and development performance 
and offers to us a better idea about smart development performance at different stages 
of socio-economic development. Our results show that  traditional indicators of 
economic globalization and also inequality have little influence on smart development 
performance, but that hitherto neglected elements of dependency and world systems 
theory gain in importance. This is especially relevant for the socio-economic theory of 
Samir Amin, but it is also true of the contributions by feminism, peace research, and by 
other various approaches in the globalization critical tradition, perhaps hitherto 
neglected here and there. Efficiency tends to increase and then to decrease with rising 
development levels. Big countries with large population resources perform better on 
our scales, and military expenditures/personnel rates are a significant block against 
smart development performance. In a sense, our results also contradict the logic 
inherent in the ‘beautiful’, but unfortunately wrong ‘small is beautiful’  analysis, 
proposed by Schumacher, 1973a: not the small countries, but the big countries find it 
easier to have a satisfactory smart development performance in comparison to the 
ecological footprint, consumed by them. Our research also shows the beneficial effects 
of migration on the sending countries. Worker remittances have a significant positive 
effect on the HPI and a host of other smart development indicators. Migration sending 
countries, as to be expected from Samir Amin’s dependency theory, reap substantial 
benefits from receiving worker remittances, while other indicators of globalization 
hardly affect the smart development performance.  
Only the following significant effects highlight the necessity to further develop the 
paradigm, developed here: the negative, crowding out effects public education 
expenditures per GDP on smart social cohesion and smart human development, and the 
negative effects, worker remittance inflows as % of GDP wield on smart economic 
growth. The impressive list of tests, speaking in favor  of the globalization critical 
paradigm, presented in this work, would suggest to further developing this research 
approach to questions of ‘smart development’.  
                                                            
14 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  29 
 
negative effects of world economic openness on smart development. The huge 
statistical negative and very uniform effects, to be observed, cannot be simply and 
easily rejected out of hand: smart R&D  and overall smart development (both 
formulations) are affected negatively by world economic openness. Among the major 
four founding figures of the ‘world systems approach’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank and 
Wallerstein, 1982) he is the only one to have come up, in addition, with a consistent 
and far-reaching critique of Islamism, confirmed by the very negative trade-off between 
Muslim population share and smart gender empowerment.  
But in some ways, Amin’s paradigm has to be expanded and refined: Feminism is an 
important driver of smart gender justice, smart democracy, and the overall smart 
development index, based on 26 variables, weighted equally. Feminist approaches, in 
principle, would be well compatible with Amin’s original approach. The 
Kalecki/Steindl paradigm also can be merged with Amin’s theory, and it has three 
significant results to its favor – the positive determination of smart R&D by public 
education expenditures, and the positive effects of the UNDP education index on smart 
human development and on overall smart development index, based on 26 variables, 
weighted equally. Several further strains of dependency/world systems research are 
confirmed in this essay: Bornschier’s dependency theory and the importance it attaches 
to multinational corporation headquarter status, which is confirmed by the positive 
effect of this variable on smart R&D; and the effect of population density, predicted in 
José Carlos Mariategui’s dependency theory on the overall smart development index, 
based on 26 variables, weighted equally.  Paul Israel Singer’s approach to dependency 
and population dynamics is confirmed by the significant negative effects of annual 
population growth rates on  smart R&D and smart social cohesion. The following 
empirical results could be interpreted to be expressions of Andre Gunder Frank’s Re-
Orient hypothesis, 1999 about a fundamental shift in the global production dynamics 
away from the old centers towards the countries of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean: 
the significant positive effect of Muslim population share per total population on smart 
economic growth, and the significant negative effects of absolute latitude on smart 
economic growth, of immigration - share of population in 2005 on smart democracy 
(the biggest migration recipients are the countries of the global ‘North’), and worker 
remittance inflows as % of GDP on smart economic growth. 
For some other processes, the empirical Amin’s five monopolies of power include two 
elements of military might, the monopoly of technology, supported by military 
expenditures of the dominant nations, and the monopoly of the military means of mass 
destruction. But the significant negative effects of military expenditures (on Happy Life 
Years, smart gender justice, the two formulations of the overall smart development 
index) or military personnel rates (smart democracy) on smart development rather 
support the arguments of quantitative peace research during the last decades with its 
apprehensions against very high military spending rates (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999; 
Heo, 1998; Mintz and Stevenson, 1995).  
As we stated, the real differences with the theories presented here are to be found in the 
negative effects of public education expenditures per GDP on smart social cohesion 
and smart human development. In this case, our response can only be to draw the 
global research community to the essays published by Blankenau and Simpson, 2004 
and Sylwester, 2000, written from the perspective of established economic theory. 
Blankenau and Simpson, 2004, because, as we already stated, they investigated the 30 
 
public education expenditure-growth relationship in the context of an endogenous 
growth model in which private and public investment are inputs to human capital 
accumulation. They could show that the positive direct effect of public education 
spending on growth can be diminished or even negated when other determinants of 
growth are negatively affected by general equilibrium adjustments. Blankenau and 
Simpson showed that the response of growth to public education expenditures may be 
non-monotonic. The relationship depends on the level of government spending, the tax 
structure and the parameters of production technologies. Sylwester, 2000, for his part 
could demonstrate that although public education expenditures are positively associated 
with future economic growth, the contemporaneous effect upon growth is negative. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Since all existing major comparative empirical studies on drivers and bottlenecks of 
environmental quality only touched upon different dependent variables, and not the 
smart development, this first international comparative study suggest cautiously that 
future research efforts in comparative environmental science would be well advised to 
take the major predictor variables of the present study as well as the environmental 
plateau curve into account (see also Weede and Kampf, 2002; de Haan, Lundstrom and 
Sturm, 2006; and Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe, 1999).  
It emerges that  the absence of ‘rent seeking’,  economic freedom and a free price 
mechanism, and worker remittances are the most important drivers of ‘smart 
development’. Most of the ‘small is beautiful’ assumptions of Schumacherian 
economics by contrast do not stand the test of cross-national development accounting 
and are squarely contradicted by our empirical results; with population density and 
population size always being among the drivers, and not the bottlenecks of ‘smart 
development’.  
As correctly predicted by Samir Amin, the big countries with huge population 
resources today are favored in their smart economic growth, their Happy Life Years, 
and their smart human development. As correctly expected by Amin, peripheral rent 
seeking is a burden and its absence, measured by economic freedom, is an asset among 
the forces, shaping international development today, especially for smart democracy, 
and the overall smart development index. In addition, Amin correctly stressed  the 
necessity for European integration –  and the positive effects of years of EU 
membership on smart democracy confirm Euro-optimism. He correctly analyzed the 
enormous transfer of resources from the center  to the periphery, brought about by 
migration, with the huge statistical observed effects of received worker remittances on 
smart human development, Happy Life Years, smart gender justice, smart R&D, and 
both formulations of the smart development index justifying his assumption. Amin’s 
dependency theory correctly predicted the very negative effects of world economic 
openness on smart development. The huge statistical negative and very uniform effects, 
to be observed, cannot be simply easily rejected out of hand: smart R&D and overall 
smart development are affected negatively by world economic openness. Among the 
major four founding figures of the ‘world systems approach’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank and 
Wallerstein, 1982) he is the only one to have come up, in addition, with a consistent 
and far-reaching critique of Islamism, confirmed by the very negative trade-off between 
Muslim population share and smart gender empowerment.  31 
 
We could also show in this article the importance of Feminism, the Kalecki/Steindl 
paradigm,  the  multinational corporation headquarter status, population density, 
population dynamics, Muslim population share per total population, absolute latitude, 
and migration on ‘smart development’. We also investigated the negative effects of 
public education expenditures per GDP on smart development.  
We are aware that our answers, raised to the questions in this article, are incomplete. 
But we hope to have provided at least some preliminary guiding posts for further 






Appendix Table 1a: The dependent variables 
 
1  Combined Failed States Index 
democracy  2  Civil and Political Liberties violations 
democracy  3  Corruption avoidance measure 
democracy  4  Democracy measure 
democracy  5  Global tolerance index 
democracy  6  Rule of law 
economic growth  7  Crisis Performance Factor 
economic growth  8  economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 
economic growth  9  economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 
economic growth  10  economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
gender  11  closing economic gender gap 
gender  12  closing educational gender gap 
gender  13  closing health and survival gender gap 
gender  14  closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 
gender  15  closing political gender gap 
gender  16  gender empowerment index value 
human development  17  Infant mortality 2005 
human development  18  female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female 
human development  19  Human development index (HDI) value 2004 
human development  20  Life Expectancy (years) 
human development  21  Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
R&D  22  Country share in top world 500 Universities 
R&D  23  per capita world class universities 
R&D  24  tertiary enrolment 
social cohesion  25  quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20% 
social cohesion  26  unemployment rate 
nonparametric_26 
equal weights 




28  overall 26 development index, based on six dimensions 
  29  component UNDP-type index for overall democracy-performance 
  30  component UNDP-type index for overall economic growth-
performance 
  31  component UNDP-type index for overall gender-performance 
  32  component UNDP-type index for overall human development-
performance 
  33  component UNDP-type index for overall R&D-performance 
  34  component UNDP-type index for overall social cohesion-
performance 
xx  35  % women in government, all levels 
xx  36  % world population 33 
 
xx  37  2000 Economic Freedom Score 
xx  38  Absolute latitude 
xx  39  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
xx  40  comparative price levels (US=1.00) 
xx  41  foreign savings rate 
xx  42  FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population 
xx  43  ln GDP per capita 
xx  44  ln GDP per capita ^2 
xx  45  Membership in the Islamic Conference 
xx  46  military expenditures per GDP 
xx  47  military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) 
xx  48  MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 
xx  49  MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 
xx  50  MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 
xx  51  Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-share per 
GDP) 
xx  52  population density 
xx  53  public education expenditure per GNP 
xx  54  UNDP education index 
xx  55  worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
xx  56  Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 
xx  57  Muslim population share per total population 
xx  58  net international migration rate, 2005-2010 
xx  59  Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
xx  60  years of membership in EMU, 2010 
xx  61  social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO) 
xx  62  ecological footprint (g ha /cap) 
xx  63  ecological footprint (g ha /cap)^2 
 34 
 




determinants  of smart 
development 
Theories or earlier empirical studies, connected with these 
variables 
% women in government, all 
levels 
Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009; Logo, 2008; Matt, 2010; 
McDowell, 1992; Orloff, 1996; Rankin, 2002; Rothstein and Teorell; 
UNDP, HDR, 1995 
% world population  Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006; 
Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Amin, 1997a, 1997b; Crenshaw and 
Robison, 2010; Kohr, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1977, 1992; Ram, 1997; 
Schumacher, 1973a, 1973b, 1976, 1977 
2000 Economic Freedom 
Score 
Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Helliwell, 1994; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer, 1999; York, Rosa and Dietz, 2003 
Absolute latitude  Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006; 
Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Easterly, 2000; Poe and Tate, 1994; Ram 
1997 
Annual population growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006; 
Acemoglu, 2003, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Crenshaw and Robison, 2010; Ram, 1997 
Comparative price levels 
(US=1.00) 
Egert, Drine and Lommatzsch, 2003; Faria and Leon-Ledesma, 2003; 
Gould, 2002; Kohler and Tausch, 2003; Paya, Venetis and Peel, 2003; 
Raffer, 1987; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; Yotopoulos and Sawada, 
2005; Yotopoulos, 1996 
Foreign savings rate  Bovenberg and van Ewijk, 1997; Cook, 1995; Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2008; Easterly and Schmidthebbel, 1993; Feldstein, 1994; 
Gine and Townsend, 2004; Singh, 1985; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; 
Tausch and Prager, 1993; Taylor, 1992 
FPZ (free production zones) 
employment as % of total 
population 
Chen, 1995; Rondinelli, 1987; Tausch and Ghymers, 2006; Tausch and 
Prager, 1993 
Immigration - Share of 
population 2005 (%) 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 1989; Dixon, 
1987; Durlauf et al., 2008; Fain, 1997; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c; Moon and Dixon, 1992; Shandra et al., 2009; Shandra, 2007a, 
2007b; Tausch and Prager, 1993 
ln GDP per capita  Afxentiou, 1990a, 1990b; Anand and Ravillion, 1993; Anson, 1988, 
1991; Barro, 2000; Cheng, 1989; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 1989; Dixon, 
1987; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Kakwani, 1993, 1995; Khan, 
1991; King, 1998; Knight and Rosa, 2011; Mazumdar, 1996, 2000; 
Moon and Dixon, 1992; Newman and Thomson, 1989; Rudra, 2009; 
Selden and Song, 1994; Stern, 2004; Stern, Common and Barboer, 
1996; Tausch and Prager, 1993 
ln GDP per capita ^2  Afxentiou, 1990a, 1990b; Anand and Ravillion, 1993; Anson, 1988, 
1991; Barro, 2000; Cheng, 1989; Dixon and Moon, 1986, 1989; Dixon, 
1987; Fosu, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Kakwani, 1993, 1995; Khan, 
1991; King, 1998; Knight and Rosa, 2011; Mazumdar, 1996, 2000; 
Moon and Dixon, 1992; Newman and Thomson, 1989; Rudra, 2009; 
Selden and Song, 1994; Stern, 2004; Stern, Common and Barboer, 
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Sudan  -2.512  -3.117  -2.788  1.650    -1.516  -0.941   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -2.381  -2.858  -1.304  -1.251    -0.270  -1.536  -3.805 
Kuwait  -1.887  -2.552  -2.290  0.693  -1.717  -0.328  -2.514   
Djibouti  -0.705  -2.500  0.185  0.478    -0.853  -0.437  -5.940 
Namibia  -1.185  -2.428  -0.260  0.362  -0.013  -2.457  -1.797  -4.061 
Central African Republic  -2.214  -2.410  -0.565  -0.190    -2.382  -0.480  -2.692 
Macedonia  -1.396  -1.853  -1.499  0.047  -0.839  -0.760  -1.529  -2.020 
Togo  -0.979  -1.830  0.075  -1.201    -0.423  0.255   
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)  -0.850  -1.756  -0.657  1.822    -1.249  0.315   
Lebanon  -1.299  -1.731  -1.842  1.470    -0.339  0.015   
United Arab Emirates  -1.970  -1.725  -2.260  0.211  -2.158  -0.003  -2.816  -0.310 
Botswana  -1.075  -1.684  0.524  2.091  -0.787  -3.052  -1.789  -2.127 
Sierra Leone  -1.400  -1.617  0.271  0.007    -2.032  0.241  -2.645 
Angola  -0.669  -1.543  -0.511  0.053  0.423  -1.811  0.057   
Congo   -0.481  -1.488  0.125  -0.376    -0.242  0.380   
Zimbabwe  -1.750  -1.264  -1.035  -2.819  -0.314  -1.956  -0.004  0.268 
Niger  -1.888  -1.257  -0.500  0.306    -2.104  -0.537  -0.029 
Chad  -1.827  -1.084  -1.350  0.144  -1.876  -1.749  -0.614  1.071 
Estonia  -1.303  -0.972  -0.788  -0.956  -0.319  -1.091  -0.850  0.258 
Turkey  -1.134  -0.946  -0.744  -0.902  -2.091  0.100  -0.729  -0.004 
Iran  -1.021  -0.934  -1.376  1.002  -1.785  -0.012  -1.341  -0.111 
Hong Kong, China (SAR)  -1.528  -0.921  -1.728  0.077    -0.106  -0.400  0.236 
Kazakhstan  -1.327  -0.882  -2.334  0.008  0.365  -0.797  -0.614  0.384 
Paraguay  -0.519  -0.849  -1.164  0.016  0.195  -0.014  -1.339  -0.894 
Burkina Faso  -1.312  -0.817  -0.556  0.784  -1.033  -2.120  -0.850  0.800 38 
 
Mauritania  -0.643  -0.758  -0.737  0.513  -0.557  -0.733  -0.663  -0.782 
Saudi Arabia  -1.064  -0.701  -1.522  -0.096  -2.211  0.718  -0.443  0.271 
Cameroon  -1.097  -0.699  -1.098  -0.343  -0.571  -1.220  -0.095  0.221 
Russia  -1.324  -0.681  -1.631  -1.070  -0.230  -0.645  0.546  0.399 
Haiti  -0.765  -0.632  -0.423  -1.672    0.349  0.388  -0.970 
Burundi  -1.598  -0.624  -0.360  -0.660    -1.480  0.142  0.738 
Nigeria  -1.092  -0.610  -0.907  -0.198  -0.341  -1.463  -0.181  0.430 
Uruguay  -0.508  -0.591  -0.227  1.197  -0.628  -0.574  -1.420  -0.176 
Mali  -0.687  -0.559  0.751  0.724  -1.239  -1.889  -0.508  -0.127 
Guinea  -1.292  -0.557  -0.553  0.120    -1.047  -0.243  0.603 
Belarus  -1.445  -0.537  -2.546  -0.141  0.419  -0.489  0.097  0.960 
Greece  -0.612  -0.494  -0.430  0.604  -0.904  -0.273  -0.834  0.113 
Syria  -0.427  -0.494  -1.629  0.454  -0.790  0.798  -0.705  -0.384 
Czech Republic  -0.564  -0.485  -0.195  0.019  -0.643  -0.337  -1.381  0.602 
Malta  -0.404  -0.401  -0.643  0.267  -0.868  0.470  -1.227  0.234 
Singapore  -0.643  -0.401  -0.722  -1.257  -1.033  0.386  0.131  0.399 
Luxembourg  -0.010  -0.394  0.308  -0.634  0.016  0.713  -2.801  -0.709 
Yemen  -0.705  -0.356  -0.401  0.943  -2.996  0.145  0.038  0.020 
Mexico  -0.288  -0.297  -0.358  -0.468  -0.564  0.407  -0.983  0.322 
Korea (Republic of)  -0.390  -0.293  -0.157  0.164  -1.589  0.376  -1.217  0.833 
Azerbaijan  -0.923  -0.260  -1.699  2.893  -1.237  -0.152  -0.129  -0.057 
Venezuela  -0.302  -0.240  -0.720  -1.194  0.023  0.484  -0.349  0.155 
Ukraine  -0.571  -0.213  -0.542  -2.114  -0.004  0.043  0.314  0.579 
Bolivia  0.200  -0.201  0.273  0.332  -0.293  0.037  0.431  -1.748 
Ethiopia  -0.626  -0.198  -0.120  1.498  -0.950  -1.593  -0.297  0.701 
Cyprus  -0.122  -0.191  0.314  1.022  -1.037  0.214  -1.654  0.345 
Egypt  -0.294  -0.158  -0.946  0.463  -1.556  1.053  -0.609  0.174 
Mongolia  -0.051  -0.150  0.373  1.579  0.022  -1.043  -0.594  -0.337 
Myanmar  -0.799  -0.150  -1.636  1.165    0.274  0.305  0.228 
Rwanda  -1.105  -0.129  -0.270  0.548    -1.277  0.202  1.012 
Zambia  -0.226  -0.110  0.731  -0.100  -0.162  -1.545  0.254  -0.228 
Algeria  -0.151  -0.098  -0.941  0.245  -0.643  0.840  -0.028  -0.461 
Albania  0.172  -0.074  -0.216  0.404  -0.661  0.870  -0.465  -0.724 
Belize  0.466  -0.052  0.301  0.296  -0.222  0.732  -1.286  -0.543 39 
 
Guyana  0.372  -0.033  0.100  1.092  0.854  -0.297  -0.967  -0.707 
South Africa  0.682  -0.013  1.216  -0.472  2.001  -1.156  -0.086  -1.625 
Kenya  -0.287  -0.009  -0.220  -0.158  0.245  -0.966  0.006  0.473 
Romania  -0.091  0.009  0.012  -1.035  -0.143  0.274  -0.436  0.607 
Croatia  0.105  0.050  -0.057  -0.553  0.128  0.480  -0.614  0.279 
Ecuador  0.597  0.055  -0.065  -0.886  0.833  0.874  -1.027  -0.363 
Latvia  -0.218  0.069  0.132  -2.330  0.740  -0.094  0.585  0.464 
Brazil  0.547  0.076  0.432  -0.351  -0.061  0.783  -0.342  -0.860 
Portugal  0.183  0.135  0.926  -0.428  -0.197  -0.088  -0.175  0.162 
Pakistan  -0.224  0.146  0.154  -0.359  -2.079  0.567  0.118  0.669 
Italy  -0.010  0.183  0.262  -0.481  -0.658  0.173  0.714  0.392 
Uganda  -0.127  0.204  -0.740  1.444  1.261  -1.262  -0.261  0.598 
Malaysia  0.099  0.205  0.031  -0.596  -0.679  0.853  -0.088  0.365 
Laos  -0.435  0.209  -1.066  0.788    0.519  -0.091  0.939 
Armenia  0.034  0.216  0.095  -1.643  -0.964  1.129  0.362  0.253 
Lithuania  0.059  0.224  0.564  -2.577  0.517  0.229  0.343  0.670 
Slovakia  0.332  0.226  0.432  0.161  -0.037  0.312  -0.587  0.247 
Spain  0.204  0.240  0.323  0.058  0.226  0.029  0.130  0.143 
Iceland  0.389  0.248  0.837  -1.138  1.598  0.024  -1.379  0.392 
Uzbekistan  0.046  0.310  -1.931  1.830  0.796  0.315  -0.727  1.055 
Tanzania  0.222  0.311  0.508  0.890  0.606  -1.455  -0.153  0.592 
Colombia  0.880  0.347  0.058  -0.755  0.612  1.404  0.198  -1.137 
Poland  0.233  0.349  0.255  0.733  -0.040  0.058  0.236  0.191 
Benin  0.010  0.351  1.383  -0.079  -1.054  -0.921  0.081  0.896 
Ireland  0.417  0.381  0.618  -0.794  0.489  -0.044  0.564  0.333 
Japan  0.104  0.384  0.889  -0.609  -0.705  0.193  0.462  0.744 
Panama  0.765  0.396  0.492  1.456  0.194  0.555  -0.346  -0.720 
Cambodia  0.228  0.398  0.045  -0.337  0.067  -0.117  0.109  0.752 
Slovenia  0.174  0.410  0.606  0.430  -0.392  0.138  -0.018  0.671 
Hungary  0.280  0.410  0.986  -0.467  -0.172  0.015  0.137  0.575 
Bulgaria  0.375  0.422  0.376  -0.981  0.498  0.398  0.201  0.397 
Jordan  0.232  0.425  -0.467  0.519  -0.558  1.033  0.474  -0.023 
Ghana  0.559  0.437  1.006  0.865  0.285  -0.560  -0.342  0.033 
Guatemala  0.694  0.471  0.392  -0.538  -0.123  1.204  -0.154  -0.171 40 
 
Tunisia  0.584  0.497  -0.027  0.798  -0.555  1.143  0.156  -0.249 
Israel  0.218  0.528  -0.155  0.204  -0.416  0.135  2.179  0.211 
Senegal  0.476  0.537  1.064  0.113  0.099  -0.378  -0.219  0.581 
Honduras  0.847  0.577  0.376  -0.359  0.604  0.866  -0.128  -0.040 
Madagascar  0.638  0.595  1.378  -1.269  1.024  -0.445  -0.038  0.412 
Georgia  0.433  0.602  0.207  -0.708  -0.702  1.162  1.240  -0.226 
Nicaragua  0.728  0.611  0.338  -0.396  0.850  0.756  -0.471  0.433 
China  0.438  0.626  -1.255  3.239  -0.380  0.893  -0.093  0.391 
Morocco  0.581  0.632  0.119  0.450  -0.688  1.164  0.238  0.093 
Nepal  0.689  0.649  0.922  -0.174  -0.539  0.583  0.344  0.026 
France  0.650  0.662  0.812  0.060  0.492  0.132  0.711  0.271 
El Salvador  1.137  0.681  0.834  -0.908  0.751  1.180  0.108  -0.531 
Canada  0.610  0.682  0.682  0.632  0.179  -0.066  1.140  0.109 
Australia  0.598  0.698  0.542  0.689  0.276  0.025  1.080  0.013 
Belgium  0.692  0.730  0.793  -0.063  0.369  0.119  1.217  0.293 
Mozambique  0.591  0.737  0.934  0.580  1.791  -1.545  0.032  0.732 
Argentina  0.998  0.764  0.509  -0.684  1.020  1.084  0.743  -0.462 
Denmark  0.792  0.821  0.865  0.059  0.736  -0.085  1.162  0.135 
Malawi  0.932  0.848  1.309  0.696  0.773  -0.646  0.448  -0.080 
Chile  1.240  0.866  1.678  0.826  -0.038  0.697  0.062  -0.295 
Bhutan  0.608  0.879  0.295  1.677    0.619  -0.037  0.710 
Thailand  0.732  0.879  0.894  -0.825  0.348  0.670  0.406  0.831 
United Kingdom  0.777  0.881  0.918  -0.120  0.361  -0.017  1.832  0.364 
Trinidad and Tobago  1.385  0.943  1.122  0.241  1.232  0.750  -0.729  0.304 
Austria  0.835  0.982  1.041  0.053  0.151  0.242  1.441  0.669 
Tajikistan  0.749  0.988  -0.185  -1.399  1.076  1.110  0.769  0.839 
Cuba  0.940  0.990  -1.333  0.374  1.230  1.707  0.256  0.910 
Germany  1.164  1.009  1.357  -0.981  0.883  0.385  1.387  0.338 
Dominican Republic  1.560  1.014  1.149  -0.228  1.015  1.488  0.429  -1.009 
Moldova  1.020  1.030  0.781  -2.607  1.223  1.211  0.843  0.630 
Kyrgyzstan  0.639  1.058  -0.330  -0.930  1.586  0.789  1.482  0.436 
Bangladesh  0.867  1.076  0.518  0.562  -0.344  0.846  0.598  0.711 
India  0.976  1.082  1.581  0.962  -1.535  0.754  0.501  0.635 
Indonesia  1.047  1.102  0.183  -0.154  0.594  1.480  0.569  0.293 41 
 
Peru  1.426  1.135  0.885  0.713  0.756  1.105  0.595  -0.383 
Vietnam  0.931  1.137  -0.595  0.853  0.678  1.650  0.100  0.830 
Switzerland  1.236  1.156  1.309  -0.241  0.636  0.288  1.606  0.595 
New Zealand  1.037  1.158  0.681  0.509  1.070  -0.114  2.343  0.052 
United States  1.069  1.294  0.516  -0.123  0.583  0.281  3.722  -0.595 
Norway  1.264  1.356  0.706  0.658  1.884  0.001  1.613  0.570 
Netherlands  1.409  1.369  1.748  -0.627  0.837  0.439  1.688  0.680 
Costa Rica  1.949  1.377  1.930  -0.075  1.024  1.670  -0.460  0.084 
Jamaica  1.687  1.401  1.703  -2.057  1.210  1.780  0.516  0.191 
Finland  1.544  1.509  1.364  -0.531  1.911  0.196  2.312  0.433 
Sri Lanka  2.083  1.709  1.261  0.095  1.474  1.699  0.127  0.549 
Sweden  1.817  1.838  1.616  -0.120  1.656  0.273  3.077  0.519 






Appendix Table 3: Rankings: global smart development 
 
  smart  smart  smart  smart  smart  smart  smart  smart 








democracy  economic 
growth 
gender  human 
development 
R&D  social 
cohesion 
Philippines  1  1  11  126  1  2  13  69 
Sri Lanka  2  3  14  63  9  4  60  37 
Costa Rica  3  6  1  76  18  5  101  85 
Sweden  4  2  5  81  6  61  2  38 
Jamaica  5  5  3  135  14  1  30  75 
Dominican Republic  6  19  16  89  20  7  36  123 
Finland  7  4  9  103  3  65  4  42 
Peru  8  13  28  29  28  18  25  108 42 
 
Netherlands  9  7  2  108  24  48  7  20 
Trinidad and Tobago  10  24  17  55  11  34  116  59 
Norway  11  8  37  33  4  81  8  36 
Chile  12  28  4  23  66  38  67  104 
Switzerland  13  11  12  90  33  57  9  31 
Germany  14  20  10  122  21  52  12  56 
El Salvador  15  36  31  118  29  12  63  112 
United States  16  9  46  82  38  58  1  114 
Indonesia  17  14  68  84  37  8  27  61 
New Zealand  18  10  39  41  16  92  3  86 
Moldova  19  18  34  139  13  10  19  26 
Argentina  20  31  47  111  19  19  21  111 
India  21  15  6  18  112  33  31  25 
Cuba  22  21  124  48  12  3  46  6 
Malawi  23  29  13  30  27  109  34  96 
Vietnam  24  12  106  22  32  6  64  11 
Colombia  25  60  76  113  34  9  54  124 
Bangladesh  26  16  45  37  80  27  24  17 
Honduras  27  44  53  95  36  25  83  94 
Austria  28  23  19  69  56  62  11  23 
Denmark  29  30  29  66  31  88  16  81 
United Kingdom  30  25  25  80  47  85  6  54 
Panama  31  55  49  11  54  43  95  117 
Tajikistan  32  22  86  132  15  17  20  8 
Thailand  33  26  26  115  48  39  37  10 
Nicaragua  34  41  56  97  23  32  103  43 
Guatemala  35  48  52  104  69  11  86  99 
Belgium  36  33  33  75  45  72  15  60 
Nepal  37  38  24  86  84  41  41  88 
South Africa  38  80  15  101  2  119  78  125 
France  39  37  32  65  41  71  23  63 
Kyrgyzstan  40  17  93  119  8  30  10  41 
Madagascar  41  43  8  131  17  104  77  45 
Canada  42  35  38  34  55  87  17  83 43 
 
Bhutan  43  27  61  6  xx  40  76  18 
Australia  44  34  43  32  50  78  18  90 
Ecuador  45  76  82  116  25  23  124  107 
Mozambique  46  32  22  36  5  128  70  16 
Tunisia  47  47  80  24  85  15  55  103 
Morocco  48  39  72  45  96  13  50  84 
Ghana  49  49  20  21  49  106  94  87 
Brazil  50  74  50  93  68  31  93  120 
Senegal  51  45  18  62  58  102  89  33 
Belize  52  82  60  52  74  35  127  113 
China  53  40  122  1  81  22  81  51 
Georgia  54  42  66  112  97  14  14  101 
Ireland  55  57  40  114  42  86  28  57 
Iceland  56  63  30  125  7  79  130  49 
Bulgaria  57  51  54  121  40  50  53  48 
Guyana  58  81  73  15  22  98  122  115 
Slovakia  59  65  51  59  65  56  107  68 
Hungary  60  52  21  99  72  80  57  35 
Poland  61  59  65  27  67  74  51  76 
Jordan  62  50  99  39  87  21  32  92 
Cambodia  63  54  77  91  59  93  62  13 
Tanzania  64  61  48  20  35  124  85  32 
Israel  65  46  84  57  83  70  5  74 
Spain  66  64  57  67  52  77  59  80 
Bolivia  67  92  62  50  76  76  35  126 
Portugal  68  73  23  98  73  89  87  78 
Slovenia  69  53  41  46  82  69  74  21 
Albania  70  83  88  47  94  24  102  118 
Croatia  71  77  81  105  57  46  110  62 
Japan  72  56  27  107  98  66  33  14 
Malaysia  73  69  78  106  95  26  79  53 
Lithuania  74  66  42  138  39  63  42  22 
Uzbekistan  75  62  135  4  26  55  115  2 
Armenia  76  67  74  133  105  16  40  67 44 
 
Benin  77  58  7  77  109  114  66  7 
Italy  78  71  64  102  93  67  22  50 
Luxembourg  79  99  59  109  62  37  139  116 
Mongolia  80  88  55  8  61  116  108  106 
Romania  81  78  79  123  70  59  98  27 
Cyprus  82  90  58  16  108  64  135  55 
Uganda  83  70  112  12  10  122  91  30 
Algeria  84  84  116  54  92  28  75  110 
Latvia  85  75  70  137  30  90  26  40 
Pakistan  86  72  69  94  118  42  61  24 
Zambia  87  85  36  79  71  129  48  102 
Kenya  88  79  89  85  51  115  72  39 
Mexico  89  97  94  100  88  49  123  58 
Egypt  90  89  117  43  113  20  109  77 
Venezuela  91  94  109  127  60  45  96  79 
Korea (Republic of)  92  96  85  58  114  53  125  9 
Malta  93  101  107  53  102  47  126  71 
Syria  94  103  129  44  100  29  114  109 
Laos  95  68  119  25  xx  44  80  5 
Congo   96  126  71  96  xx  95  39  xx 
Uruguay  97  108  90  13  90  107  132  100 
Paraguay  98  117  121  72  53  84  128  121 
Czech Republic  99  102  87  71  91  100  131  29 
Ukraine  100  93  102  136  63  75  44  34 
Greece  101  104  98  35  103  97  118  82 
Ethiopia  102  91  83  9  104  130  92  19 
Singapore  103  100  110  130  107  51  58  47 
Mauritania  104  115  111  40  86  110  113  119 
Angola  105  127  101  68  43  132  68  xx 
Mali  106  107  35  28  111  133  105  98 
Djibouti  107  137  67  42  xx  113  99  133 
Yemen  108  98  96  19  122  68  69  89 
Haiti  109  111  97  134  xx  54  38  122 
Myanmar  110  87  131  14  xx  60  45  72 45 
 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)  111  132  108  5  xx  121  43  xx 
Azerbaijan  112  95  132  2  110  94  84  95 
Togo  113  133  75  128  xx  103  47  xx 
Iran  114  120  126  17  116  83  129  97 
Saudi Arabia  115  114  128  78  121  36  100  64 
Botswana  116  129  44  3  99  140  136  128 
Nigeria  117  109  115  88  79  125  88  44 
Cameroon  118  113  120  92  89  120  82  73 
Rwanda  119  86  92  38  xx  123  52  3 
Turkey  120  121  113  117  119  73  117  91 
Namibia  121  136  91  49  64  139  137  132 
Guinea  122  106  103  61  xx  117  90  28 
Lebanon  123  131  134  10  xx  101  71  xx 
Estonia  124  122  114  120  78  118  119  66 
Burkina Faso  125  116  104  26  106  137  120  12 
Russia  126  112  130  124  75  108  29  46 
Kazakhstan  127  118  138  73  46  112  111  52 
Macedonia  128  134  127  70  101  111  133  127 
Sierra Leone  129  128  63  74  xx  135  49  129 
Belarus  130  105  139  83  44  105  65  4 
Hong Kong, China (SAR)  131  119  133  64  xx  91  97  70 
Burundi  132  110  95  110  xx  126  56  15 
Zimbabwe  133  125  118  140  77  134  73  65 
Chad  134  123  125  60  117  131  112  1 
Kuwait  135  138  137  31  115  99  138  xx 
Niger  136  124  100  51  xx  136  106  93 
United Arab Emirates  137  130  136  56  120  82  140  105 
Central African Republic,  138  135  105  87  xx  138  104  130 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  139  139  123  129  xx  96  134  131 




Appendix Table 4: Data sources 
 
All the original variables are contained in: 
 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017 and http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383#more-2383 
 
This data set combines the most up-to-date data on the social, economic, political, and environmental effects of globalization. The dataset in EXCEL format is freely  
available and draws on the following sources: 
 
  Variable Label  Source 
1  Combined Failed States Index  http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452&Itemid=900 
2  Civil and political liberty violations  ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
3  Closing economic gender gap  World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNet
work/index.htm  
4  Closing educational gender gap  World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNet
work/index.htm  
5  Closing health and survival gender gap  World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNet
work/index.htm  
6  Closing of global gender gap overall score 
2009 
World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNet
work/index.htm  
7  Closing political gender gap  World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNet
work/index.htm  
8  Corruption avoidance measure  ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
9  Country share in top world 500 Universities  University of Shanghai http://www.arwu.org/ 
10  Crisis Performance Factor  calculated from IMF and UNDP. IMF prognosis April 2009 
11  Democracy measure  ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
12  Ecological footprint (gha per capita)  Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
13  Economic growth IMF prediction growth rate 
in 2009 
IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php  
14  Economic growth IMF prediction growth rate  IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php  47 
 
in 2010 
15  Economic growth in real terms per capita, per 
annum, 1990-2005 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
16  Environmental Performance Index (EPI)  EPI Yale Columbia Index http://epi.yale.edu/Home  
17  ESI-Index Environment Sustainability Index 
(Yale Columbia) 
Yale/Columbia ESI Index website http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ 
18  Female survival - probability of surviving to 
age 65 
calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
19  Gender empowerment index value  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
20  Global tolerance index  calculated from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
21  Happy life years rs)  Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
22  Happy Planet Index, HPI  Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
23  Human development index (HDI) value 2004  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
24  Infant mortality 2005  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
25  Labor force participation rate of migrants (both 
sexes) 
UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
26  Life expectancy (years)  Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
27  Life satisfaction (0-10)  Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html 
28  Net exports of ecological footprint gha per 
person 
Global footprint network at 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/Ecological_Footprint_Atlas_2009.pdf 
29  Per capita world class universities  Calculated from the data of this work 
30  Quintile share income difference between 
richest and poorest 20% 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
31  Rule of law  Yale/Columbia ESI Index website 
32  Tertiary enrollment  Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php  
33  Total unemployment rate of immigrants  (both 
sexes)  
UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
34  Unemployment rate  United Nations Statistics http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/Products/socind/unemployment.htm  
35  Cyclones - average number of tropical 
cyclones per year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
36  ln (number of people per million inhabitants 




37  Tertiary emigration rate  UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
38  Droughts - average number of droughts per 
year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
39  Earthquakes - average number of earthquakes 
per year 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm 
40  Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP  ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
41  Carbon emissions per capita  ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
42  % women in government, all levels  UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
43  % world population  calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
44  2000 Economic Freedom Score  Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Index/  
45  Absolute latitude  Easterly, William, New York University – Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, May 2000 
“The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 2346, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630718. Data in EXCEL-format 
still retrievable best from a “Google” search, entering the words “easterly POLRIGHTS98” at the site of the 
http://www.cgdev.org/. The address of the site is given as 
www.cgdev.org/doc/…/easterly/easterly_consensusdata.xls. Alternatively, a “Google search” using the search 
profile words “easterly_consensusdata.xls” also yields the data set  
46  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%)  calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
47  Comparative price levels (US=1.00)  calculated from UNDP (GDP curr/GDP PPP) UNDP Human Development Report Office 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
48  Foreign savings rate  UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
49  FPZ (free production zones) employment as % 
of total population 
calculated from ILO http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/epz/epz-db.pdf 
50  ln GDP per capita  UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
51  ln GDP per capita ^2  UNDP HDR 2000 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
52  Membership in the Islamic Conference  OIC http://www.oic-oci.org/  
53  Military expenditure per GDP  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
54  Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)  US CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html 
55  MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP  UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1  49 
 
56  MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP  UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 




57  MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005  UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. In addition: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. Furthermore 




58  Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP 
+ import-share per GDP) 
calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
59  Population density  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
60  Public education expenditure per GNP  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
61  UNDP education index  UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/  
62  Worker remittance inflows as % of GDP  UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
63  Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%)  UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
64  Muslim population share per total population  Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php  
65  Net international migration rate, 2005-2010  UNDP HDR 2009 http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=g&t=*&k= 
66  Years of membership in the EU, 2010  Website European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm, as well as http://www.state.gov/  
67  Years of membership in EMU, 2010  Website European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm, as well as http://www.state.gov/  
68  Social security expenditure per GDP average 
1990s (ILO) 
ILO http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/protection/socfas/research/stat/table14.htm  
69  Overall 30 variable development index  calculated from this work 
70  Overall 35 variable development index  calculated from this work 
71  Overall 35 variable development index, based 
on 7 dimensions 
calculated from this work 
72  Avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha 
per person 
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